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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether this Court should reaffirm its decision in
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), and hold that the educational benefits that flow from
a diverse student body to an institution of higher education,
its students, and the public it serves, are sufficiently
compelling to permit the school to consider race and/or
ethnicity as one of many factors in making admissions
decisions through a "properly devised" admissions program.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that
the University of Michigan Law School's admissions
program is properly devised.
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1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
There is no genuine dispute in this case about the
relevant historical facts, and the record evidence establishes
three central realities that provide firm support for the
Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the admissions program in
use at the University of Michigan Law School ("the Law
School") does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
First, academic selectivity and student body diversity,
including racial diversity, are both integral to the
educational mission of the Law School. Second, the Law
School successfully realizes both goals through an
admissions program that is "virtually indistinguishable"
from the Harvard plan that five Justices approved in
Bakke. 1 It evaluates the potential contributions and
academic promise of every individual and does not employ
quotas or set-asides.
Third, no honestly colorblind
alternative policy could produce educationally meaningful
racial diversity at present without enrolling students who
are academically unprepared for the rigorous legal
education that the Law School offers.
There is accordingly no way for this Court to reverse
the Sixth Circuit's decision without ''break[ing] ... new
ground." U.S. Br. at 10. This Court must instead decide
whether, consistent with Bakke, the finest law schools
throughout the country may continue to train this Nation's
leaders in integrated classrooms-as they have done so
effectively for the past three decades-or whether they now
must choose between maintaining academic distinction and
avoiding very substantial resegregation.2

1

Pet. App. 29a. ''Pet. App." refers to the Petition Appendix; "JA"
refers to the Joint Appendix filed in this Court; "CAJA" refers to the
Joint Appendix filed in the Sixth Circuit; ''Tr." refers to the transcript of
the trial, Record 331 (Vol. 1) through Record 345 (Vol. 15).
2
Because this Court has held that Title VI imposes substantive
obligations coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause, the decision in
this case will bind private as well as public institutions. Pet. Br. at 20.
Petitioner offers no basis for applying any different standards under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, and failed to preserve that argument in any event. See also

2
1. The Law School is among the Nation's leading law
schools. It has achieved that preeminence by carefully
selecting and training students of exceptional promise to
serve as leaders of the profession and of our Nation.3 The
Law School has determined that effective pursuit of this
mission requires a curriculum that ''firmly links professional
training to the opportunity for reflection about many of our
most fundamental public questions, such as ... the effects of
religious, racial and gender intolerance in our culture"
(CAJA 1658), and integrated classes comprising a "mix of
students. with varying backgrounds and experiences who
will respect and learn from each other," each of whom is
"among the most capable students applying to American law
schools in a given year'' and has a "strong likelihood of
succeeding iri the practice of law and contributing in diverse
ways to the well-being of others." JA 110.
Neither the petitioner nor the United States questions
the legitimacy or importance of these goals to the Law
School's mission. Extensive (and virtually unchallenged)
evidence confirms that a racially diverse student body helps
students to develop the interpersonal skills necessary to
''work more effectively and more sensitively" in a world that
"is and will he multi-racial" (CAJA 2243); helps to dispel
historic stereotypes (CAJA 7697-99); and introduces
students to unfamiliar experiences and perspectives to
promote the ''mutual respect" and "sympathetic
engagement with the experiences of other people that are
basic to the mature and responsible practice of law" (CAJA
5106). See infra pp. 21-26. The evidence also proves that
fully realizing these benefits requires ''meaningful numbers"
or a "critical mass" of minority students (JA 120)-enough
to create significant opportunities for personal interaction,
to show that there is no consistent "minority viewpoint" on

Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 389-90 (1982) (declining
to impose broader obligations under § 1981).
3
JA 110. The Law School receives more than 3500 applications each
year and makes approximately 1300 offers of admission to fill a class of
around 350 students. See generally JA 156-203.

3

particular issues, Pet. App. 215a, and to ensure that
"minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons
for their race, and feel comfortable discussing issues freely
based on their personal experiences." Id. at 28a.
Based on the persuasive weight of the educational
evidence, the district court emphasized that it "d[id] not
doubt that racial diversity in the law school population"
promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break down
racial stereotypes, "enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races and better equips them to serve as
lawyers in an increasingly diverse society and an
increasingly competitive world economy." Id. at 246a. The
court also acknowledged that the benefits of diversity are ·
"important and laudable," because "classroom discussion is
livelier, more spirited, and simply more enlightening and
interesting'' when the students have ''the greatest possible
variety of backgrounds." Id. at 246a, 244a. Indeed,
petitioner acknowledged that "no one is contesting that
there are educational benefits of diversity. It's simply not
an issue in the case." CAJA 7192.
2. Petitioner and the United States nonetheless
challenge the admissions policy that has been carefully
crafted to achieve meaningful educational diversity. In
1992, the Law School charged a distinguished committee of
legal scholars to design a policy that would further its
mission and comply with this Court's decision in Bakke.
CAJA 7486-87, 7546-47. The policy they designed-like the
Harvard plan it was modeled on-openly acknowledges that
the racial background of a minority applicant can be one of
many factors relevant to the admissions decision. JA 121.
Petitioner's own expert conceded, however, that race is not
the predominant factor under that policy. Tr. 2:211-13.
Instead, its hallmark is a focus on academic capabilities
coupled with a flexible assessment of every individual
applicant's talents, experiences and potential ''to contribute
to the learning of those around them." JA 111.
First, the policy requires the director of admissions, in
consultation with the faculty, to evaluate each applicant
based on all of the information available in the file. JA 114-

4

21. The Law School does not use any formulas or set
criteria for admission.
The policy requires careful
consideration of an applicant's undergraduate grades and
LSAT score because they are important (though imperfect)
predictors of academic success in law school, and the
''minimal criterion is that no applicant should be admitted
unless we expect that applicant to do well enough to
graduate with no serious academic problerns.',4 But "[t]here
is no combination of grades and test scores ... below which
an applicant will automatically be denied admission, or
above which admission is guaranteed." Pet. App. 5a. The
policy instead requires the admissions office to look beyond
grades to other criteria important to the Law School's
educational objectives, such as "experiences ... likely to be
different from those of most students." JA 114. As Dean
Jeffrey Lehman explained, an applicant's potential
"contribution to the diversity of the environment" is an
important part of his or her qualifications. Tr. 5:195.
Second, the policy does not restrict the types of
diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight" in
the admissions process. J A 120. The Law School seriously
considers each "applicant's promise of making a notable
contribution to the class by way of a particular strength,
attainment or characteristic-e.g., an unusual intellectual
achievement, employment experience, nonacademic
performance, or personal background." JA 84. The Law
School's policy explains that effective pursuit of its
educational mission has been greatly furthered by the
presence of ''meaningful numbers" or a "critical mass" of
"students from groups which have been historically
discriminated against, like African-Americans, Hispanics,
and Native Arnericans"5 because these students "are
particularly likely to have experiences and perspectives of
4

JA 111-13; Tr. 14:110-11 (Lempert). As Dean Lehman explained,
''there is one absolute baseline criterion· upon which we will not
compromise," and that is that "[w ]e don't want to admit students who we
think won't be able to make it. It's not right and it's not fair." Tr. 5:147.
5
Members of these groups are refeITed to as "minority" students.

5
special importance to our mission." JA 120. But many other
diversity-related factors are seriously considered, such as a
record of "leadership, work experience, [and] unique talents
or interests." Pet. App. 27a-28a; see Tr. 1:244-45.
Third, the Law School's process ensures that candidates
have an opportunity to share all relevant information about
their background for consideration.
The application
requests a personal statement, letters of recommendation,
and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will
contribute to the life and diversity of the Law School. JA
83-84. The background and experiences revealed by the
application "commonly" make a difference in the admissions
decision. Tr. 1:244-45. By applying this flexible policy, the
Law School has generally succeeded in enrolling classes of
superb students from diverse backgrounds that include
enough minority students to provide meaningful integration
of its classrooms and residence halls.
3. There is literally no chance that these results could
be sustained under any race-blind admissions program. In
1997 when petitioner applied, there were only 67 minority
applicants, compared to 1236 white and Asian American
applicants, in the LSAT range (164+) from which over 90%
of the admitted white students were drawn. J A 172-79.
Competition for these minority applicants is extremely
fierce, and the Law School cannot hope to enroll more than a
few of them. In 2000, there were only 26 African-American
applicants nationwide with at least a 3.5 GPA and a 165 on
the LSAT compared to 3173 whites and Asian Americans.6
Any race-blind methodology applied to the upper and
middle grade and test score ranges will therefore invariably
select a class with very few minority students.
6
And there were only 170 African-Americans with at least a 3.0 GPA
and 160 LSAT, compared to 11,348 whites and Asian Americans. Law
School Admissions Council, National Statistical Report, 1995-96 through
1999-00 (2001) (lodged with the Court by LSAC). Because the United
States has relied on data outside the record to support its assertion that
race-neutral alternatives are available, we reference some responsive
information appropriate for judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.
,

6

Although the district court did not designate the issue
of race-neutral alternatives for trial (CAJA 99), it found "no
reason to doubt" that the number of minority students
would drop "sharply and dramatically'' under a "race-blind
admission system" that continues to give substantial weight
to grades and LSAT scores. Pet. App. 229a. An unrebutted
expert study demonstrated that a class of 400 students
selected that way would have included a total of 16 AfricanAmerican, Hispanic and Native American students-down
from 58 under the Law School's policy. CAJA 6047. The
educational benefits that depend upon opportunities for
frequent interaction among students of different races
cannot be achieved with so few minority enrollments.7
The district court nevertheless faulted the Law School
for its "failure to consider" and "perhaps experiment" with
race-neutral programs that would sacrifice academic
excellence and selectivity-such as the random selection of
applications that satisfy minimum quantitative credentials
through a ''l()ttery.',s Pet. App. 251a. The Sixth Circuit
7

The study demonstrated the impact of a race-blind policy on typical
learning environments. With a hypothetical 58 minority students, there is
a 76% chance that a first-year small section of about 43 students will have
more than one or two African-American students and more than one or
two Hispanic students. With only 16 minority students, the probability is
4%. The chance of having such modest, concrete diversity in a residential
dormitory section would fall from 34% to 1%. The probability of a student
being the only African-American in a small section would increase from
4% to 51 %; and in a dormitory section from 18% to 69%. CAJA 6045-49.
8
Petitioner's year 2000 grids, JA 196-203, show that even a race-blind
lottery for every applicant scoring above 150 (50th percentile) on the
LSAT would have offered admission to about 15 African-American, 16
Hispanic, and 3 Native American applicants-a 79% decline. By
preventing the Law School from accepting students with truly
exceptional academic qualifications at a higher rate than those with less
impressive credentials, a lottery would also seriously undermine its other
educational goals. (The number of offers extended to applicants scoring
170 or over on the LSAT would, for example, fall by 88%.) Moreover,
even these bleak results could not be sustained once it became known that
the Law School was conducting such a lottery, because the pool would
immediately be flooded with applications from lower-scoring white
students who do not currently apply, CAJA 7902-03 (Orfield), and

7

rejected that reasoning. It held that "Bakke and the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions [do not] require the
Law School to choose between meaningful racial and ethnic
diversity and academic selectivity." Id. at 35a. Petitioner
suggests that the Sixth Circuit's decision should be reversed
because it applied de novo review to this and several other
issues, but the courts below clearly disagreed only as to
matters oflaw and legal characterization, not historical fact. 9
4. The district court similarly made no factual finding
that the Law School was administering a secret quota
forbidden by this Court's decision in Bakke. See Pet. Br. at
41-42; U.S. Br. at 9. To the contrary, it acknowledged that
''the law school has not set aside a fixed number of seats for
underrepresented minority students, as did the medical
school in Bakke." Pet. App. 248a. The district court did
reason that the admissions policy should be characterized as
the functional equivalent of a quota because the ''practical
effect" of the policy has been to admit more than 10%
minorities each year. Id. The Sixth Circuit rejected that
legal conclusion, however, observing that the Harvard plan
also pursued "meaningful numbers of minority students" but
that did not make it a quota. Id. at 27a-28a.
Indeed, the record confirms that the faculty members
who drafted the admissions policy in 1991 took precautions
to ensure that the policy would not be read to authorize,
require, or encourage admissions officers to admit a
predetermined number of minority applicants. An early
draft of the policy expressly stated that the Law School was
likely to obtain the benefits of a critical mass when minority
enrollment ranged between 11 and 17%. Pet. App. 225a.
The chair of the Committee responsible for developing the
policy explained that this range was derived from the
educational experience of the faculty in prior years. CAJ A
7564-65. Although one member of the Committee advocated
that this numerical range should be retained in the final
abandoned by high-scoring students-who place great weight on
academic selectivity, and the national rankings driven by it.
9
See infra pp. 33 n.51, 41 n.69.

8
policy because they were "just guidelines" and therefore
"permissible under Bakke," the Committee rejected that
suggestion in order to avoid ''the risk that exists when you
put numbers in, even as a guideline," that a future
admissions officer might "see these numbers" and feel bound
by them. CAJA 7736 (Lehman). 10
Nor is there any evidence that the Law School officials
violated the intent of this policy by secretly directing the
admission of a predetermined number of minority
applicants. Dean Lehman and other Law School officials
who administer the policy testified categorically that they
did not employ any numerical quota in assembling the
class. 11 And the district court determined that they "acted
reasonably and in good faith in adopting and administering
the policy'' in an "attempt□ to comply with Bakke" (Pet.
App. 254a, 253a)-a finding that cannot be reconciled with
any notion that they devised "disguised quotas." U.S. Br. at
9. Between 1993 and 2000, the number of minority students
in each class varied from 42 to 73 (13.5-20.1%)-a range
inconsistent with the operation of a fixed quota. JA 156-203;
CAJA 1536, 4929-96, 5387-93, 5463-69; Pet. App. 30a.
Dean Lehman also testified without contradiction that
enrolling a critical mass of minority students is merely one
"value in [the] composition of the student body that is
important to us pedagogically" but ''not the only value."
CAJA 7767-68. That goal is balanced against competing
objectives, such as assembling a class that shows

10

Petitioner asserts that the 1992 policy merely ''ratif[ied]" a previous
policy that included a goal of 10 to 12% minorities. Pet. Br. at 3-4.
Although the 1992 policy was intended to "ratify [the Law School's]
attention in the past to race for purposes of establishing a diverse law
school class," CAJA 7533 (Lempert), the policy "represent[ed] a major
change" in the way applications were processed, id. at 7504. The mission
of the Committee was to "rewrite, rethink, [and] redo the admissions
policy'' in order to ensure that ''the policy was ... constitutional" under
Bakke. Id. at 7492; see also Tr. 3:70 (Bollinger).
11
Pet. App. 26a; CAJA 7749-50 (Lehman), 7313 (Munzel), 7667, 7693
(Shields); Tr. 3:64 (Bollinger).
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exceptional academic promise and is broadly diverse in
attributes other than race. Id. at 7251-54, 7521-26.
5. Petitioner also asks this Court to find that the "plus
factor" afforded to some minority applicants was just too
large. But the district court did not find that the Law
School could have admitted meaningful numbers of minority
applicants if it had assigned less weight to these applicants'
contributions to racial diversity; or that the acknowledged
educational benefits could have been achieved with fewer
minority students; or that the plus factor was so large that
the minority students were not well qualified for the rigors
of the Law School's demanding academic program.
Although the court found that the median undergraduate
GPA of every underrepresented minority group "has been
lower than the median GPA of Caucasians by approximately
one-tenth to three-tenths of a point" between 1995 and 2000,
and that the median LSAT has been approximately "seven
to nine points" lower,12 it never questioned (and petitioner
stipulated) that all of the applicants adrnitted under the Law
School's . policy were qualified. CAJA 8785. The Law
School's minority students have grades and scores whichwhile not always as exceptional as many white and Asian
American admittees-nonetheless are superior to most
applicants nationwide. They graduate, pass the bar exam,
obtain judicial clerkships, and succeed in the practice of law
at rates essentially indistinguishable from their white and
Asian American classmates. Id. at 6222-23, 6243-58, 5870-81.
Petitioner nevertheless relies upon certain disparities
in numerical credentials reflected in her admissions "grids"
as proof that the program is not narrowly tailored to achieve
its educational goals. Pet. Br. at 5-10. These grids were
12

Pet. App. 275a-76a. These disparities significantly overstate the size
of the Law School's ''plus factor." As a vertical line drawn anywhere on
the graph at JA 219 will illustrate, there would be large differences in
average test scores between admitted white and minority students even
if the process were entirely race-blind-because most of the minority
students would still be in the bottom half of the pool. See Bowen & Bok,
Shape of the River 29, 42 (2000) (demonstrating that race-blind admissions
would eliminate only 14% of the test score gap at selective universities).
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generated by her statistician. It is undisputed that the Law
School used nothing of the kind in its actual admissions
process.13 They do, however, illustrate two key points.
First, the grids reveal that an applicant's college GPA,
LSAT score, and ethnic background all influence admissions
decisions, but even together those factors fail to explain the
outcomes-either within or across racial categories. More
than 40% of the admitted white and Asian American
applicants from 1995 to 2000 came from "cells" in which at
least 30% of the total white and Asian American applicants
were rejected, demonstrating that subjective factors make
the difference between acceptance and rejection for a great
many of them as well.
And those factors can be given substantial weight.
Even crediting the district court's suggestion that diversity
considerations might outweigh differences of up to a third of
a letter grade or 7-9 points on the LSAT for minority
students, the record shows that white and Asian American
applicants frequently receive similar credit for other
diversity factors. Holding GPA constant at 3.5-3.74, 53
white or Asian American students were accepted between
1995 and 2000 with an LSAT of 160 or below, whereas 88
with an LSAT of 167 or above were rejected. Holding·
LSAT constant at 164-166, 189 white or Asian American
applicants with a 3.49 GPA or lower were accepted over 283
with a 3.75 or better. 14 Non-minority applicants are also
frequently accepted with grades and test scores lower than
minority applicants who are rejected. Sixty-nine minority
applicants were rejected between 1995 and 2000 with at
least a 3.5 GPA and a 159 or higher on the LSAT, while 85
white and Asian American applicants were accepted from
the same or lower cells.15 These observations do not suggest
13

CAJA 7289-90, 7687-88; Tr. 5:139-42.
These numbers would be significantly higher but for the fact that the
Law School naturally finds quite substantial diversity in a variety of
attributes within the large pool of white and Asian American applicants
with the highest academic credentials. JA 121-22.
15
See generally JA 156-203. Note that petitioner's "Selected Minority"
grids exclude "Other Hispanic" applicants-all of whom are properly
14
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that race does not matter in the admissions process. The ·
grids demonstrate, however, that the Law School considers
race only in the context of an individualized review seriously
weighing many factors, including subjective non-racial
diversity factors that make a real and dispositive difference
for many white and Asian American applicants as well.
Second, the Law School's individualized consideration of
racial background does not actually affect the outcome of the
overwhelming majority of the admissions decisions each
year, or unfairly burden other applicants who may have
higher test scores but who would not significantly enhance
the diversity of the class. Plaintiff's own expert testified
that he was "sure" that grades and test scores had the
"strongest association with admissions decisions" relative to
any other factors, including race.
Tr. 2:211-13.
Approximately two-thirds of the Law School's minority
applicants are denied admission each year, and in each of the
years between 1995 and 2000 the Law School denied
admission to a greater proportion of minority applicants
than majority applicants. CAJA 6045, 7585. Nor is there
any dispute that the average odds of admission for nonminority applicants would have increased by less than 5% if
the Law School had not taken race into account as part of its
assessment of diversity contributions. Id. at 6045.
Accordingly, petitioner's "probabilities" and "odds
ratios" comparing white and minority applicants with
identical credentials (Pet. Br. at 8-10) would reveal nothing
unlawful even if the methodology were sound. See infra
p. 44. It would be surprising indeed, in a regime in which
race is given any weight, if minority applicants were not
admitted at substantially higher rates than otherwise
similar non-minority applicants. As the Sixth Circuit
included among the category described as Hispanic in the Law School
policy. CAJA 321, 477; see also, e.g., CAJA 7311 (confirming that some
minorities are rejected even though whites with lower quantitative
credentials are accepted) (Munzel); JA 182-83 (white applicant in 1998 in
LSAT 151-53/GPA 2.75-2.99 "cell" admitted while all five AfricanAmerican applicants in the same cell were rejected).
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explained, petitioners have "concede[d] that all admitted
students are qualified," and evidence that race ''plays an
important role in some admissions decisions" is simply the
''logical result of reliance on the Harvard Plan." Pet. App.
31a (emphasis added).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Twenty-five years ago, this Court resolved a bitter
national controversy over the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions policies in its landmark decision in
Bakke. The essential holding of Bakke is that quotas and
set-asides are illegal, but that some attention may be paid to
race in the context of a competitive review of the ways that
each applicant will contribute to the overall diversity of the
student body. As the Sixth Circuit properly held, the Law
School's
admissions
practices
are
"virtually
indistinguishable" from the Harvard College policy
specifically endorsed by five Justices in Bakke. Pet. App.
29a. Petitioner therefore cannot prevail unless the square
holding of Bakke is overruled, expressly or sub silentio.
No persuasive justification exists for making such a
radical and disruptive break with settled precedent. Bakke
has been relied upon by universities for decades with the
express authorization of the Department of Education, and
has become an important part of our national culture. It is
also clearly correct.
Despite noble aspirations and
considerable progress, our society remains deeply troubled
by issues of race.
Against that backdrop, there are
important educational benefits-for students and for the
wider society-associated with a diverse, racially integrated
student body. Indeed, petitioner does not disagree. In the
face of overwhelming educational and social science
evidence presented by the Law School, she conceded the
point in the district court.
The Law School's admissions policy is cautious, limited,
and narrowly tailored to the pursuit of that compelling
educational goal. The heart of that policy is an individualized
review of the many different ways that each applicant might
contribute to the learning environment at the Law School,
and to the legal profession and our Nation after graduation.
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Because the educational benefits of a diverse student body
depend on opportunities for interaction among students, the
Law School hopes that its policy will enroll a "critical mass"
of minority students. Its experience has been that a critical
mass helps to foster more genuine interaction among
students of different racial backgrounds. But that goal is
constantly balanced against the Law School's other
educational objectives, such as assembling a class that is
both exceptionally academically qualified and· broadly
diverse in ways other than race. The Law School does not
employ quotas or set-asides, and race is by no means the
predominant factor in its admissions program.
There are no viable race-neutral alternatives at this
time. The Law School firmly believes that high academic
standards and a diverse student body are both integral to
effective pursuit of its chosen educational mission. It is
fortunate to receive enough applications from talented, wellqualified minority students to avoid both the Scylla of
resegregation and the Charybdis of enrolling students
unprepared for the education that it offers. Given the
national population of college graduates, however, law
schools like Michigan cannot admit those students in
meaningful numbers without paying some attention to race.
This dilemma is shared by every highly selective law
school in the United States, public and private. It is not an
exaggeration, therefore, to say that a decision by this Court
overruling Bakke would force most of this Nation's finest
institutions to choose between dramatic resegregation and
completely abandoning the demanding standards that have
made American higher education the envy of the world. The
United States understands the nature of that choice, yet
pretends that the Law School could magically resolve it by
"easing admissions requirements for all students." U.S. Br.
at 14. That is a fantasy. No honestly colorblind alternative
could produce educationally meaningful racial diversity at
present without substantially abandoning reliance on
traditional academic criteria, and · hence abandoning
academic excellence as well. The Law School, having
struggled for more than a century to build a great
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institution dedicated to excellence in the advancement of
human knowledge, will not willingly do that. But neither
does it relish the prospect of trying to educate the next
generation of leaders for the legal profession and our Nation
in a segregated enclave, "in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts." Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
ARGUMENT
I. THE LAW SCHOOL HAS A COMPELLING
INTEREST IN THE LIMITED, COMPETITIVE
CONSIDERATION OF RACE IN ADMISSIONS
TO SECURE THE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
THAT
FLOW
FROM
STUDENT BODY
DIVERSITY
A. This Court Held In Bakke That Institutions Of
Higher Education May Consider The Race Of
Applicants AB One Factor Among Many When
Attempting To Assemble A Diverse, Racially
Integrated Student Body
Although different Justices articulated a range of views
about the permissibility of race-conscious admissions
practices in Bakke, Justice Powell forged a middle ground
that constituted {and has ever since been relied on as) the
holding of the case. Joining Justice Powell, a majority of
this Court agreed on several important propositions-all of
which were essential to the result. Five Justices reversed
the California Supreme Court's mandate prohibiting the
University of California from considering race in admissions
decisions, 438 U.S. at 270 n.**, 271, agreeing that the
"competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin" in the
context of a ''properly devised admissions program" would
be constitutional and consistent with Title VI, id. at 320.
Five Justices agreed that the University of California could
constitutionally devise such a program even though it was
"conceded that [the University] had no history of
discrimination" and the University articulated no narrowly
remedial justification for considering race. Id. at 296 n.36
(Powell, J.). And all five agreed that Harvard College's
admissions policy-which also articulated no remedial
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purpose and was solely tailored toward, and justified by,
Harvard's desire to assemble a diverse student body-was
"properly devised" and "constitutional." Id. at 320, 326 n.1
(Brennan, J., concurring in part).
The minimum core or essential holding of Bakke,
therefore, is that a University may consider race in
admissions, even if it has no historical discrimination of its
own to remedy, at least in the manner exemplified by the
Harvard plan appended to Justice Powell's opinion. These
observations require no sophisticated analysis, and they
alone are sufficient to support the Sixth Circuit's judgment
in this case-since as that court held the Law School's policy
is "virtually indistinguishable" from the Harvard plan.
Petitioner nevertheless asserts (Pet. Br. at 27-28) that
the holding in Part V-C of Bakke has no precedential force
here because it says nothing about the permissible purposes
of a "competitive" race-conscious plan. Although the broad
language of Part V-C certainly leaves a great deal
unspecified, that paragraph was not the only proposition to
garner a majority. Five Justices also specifically agreed
that the Harvard admissions policy was constitutional.
Because the sole justification advanced in that plan was
student body diversity, it necessarily follows that five
Justices agreed that diversity was a sufficient justification.
Petitioners resist that obvious conclusion based on the fact
that Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun
"agree[d] with Mr. Justice Powell that a plan like the
'Harvard' plan ... is constitutional under [their] approach, at
least so long as the use of race to achwve an integrated
student body is necessitated by the lingering effects of past
discrimination." 438 U.S. at 326 n.1 (Brennan, J. concurring
in part) (emphasis added). But the italicized language in
Justice Brennan's opinion means only that a policy like
Harvard's must cease considering race once the disparities
in applicants' numerical qualifications produced by our
Nation's discriminatory past have been eliminated, because
a racially diverse class could then be assembled by other
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means. The Law School agrees with that caveat, and Justice
Powell plainly did too; sadly, that day has not yet arrived.16
Justice Powell's reasoning was also the "narrowest
ground" articulated by any of the Justices supporting
reversal, and is therefore a holding of this Court under
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). It is
possible to tie oneself in metaphysical knots when applying
Marks, by postulating creative and endlessly different
theoretical axes along which one opinion or another might
be considered the most ''narrow." But Justice Powell's
opinion was "narrowest" in every sense that mattered: it
completely defined, as a practical matter, the universe of
race-conscious admissions programs that a majority of this
Court regarded as constitutional.17 It was immediately
obvious to courts,18 commentators19 and countless public
16

Justice Brennan and his colleagues did not mean that Harvard's
admissions practices were constitutional only if justified by a remedial
purpose. The language they chose ("so long as ... necessitated by" rather
than ''if ... justified by") makes that clear. See Pet. App.18a & n.7, 19a &
n.8. It also would have made no sense. Harvard's policy was forthrightly
non-remedial in motivation, 438 U.S. at 321-22, and therefore (for reasons
ably explained by petitioners themselves (Pet. Br. at 35)) it could not have
been rendered constitutional by an unarticulated remedial rationale.
17
The other Justices forming that majority believed that the
Constitution permits much more extensive and varied consideration of
race in admissions; indeed, they voted to affirm the rigid 16-seat quota
employed by UC-Davis. In other words, those Justices had much broader
reasons for reversing the California Supreme Court because they
believed it improperly foreclosed a wider spectrum of legal conduct than
Justice Powell did. See City of Richrrwnd v. J.A Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 496-97 (1989) (noting that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke would
permit consideration of race only to pursue narrowly "focused" objectives,
not the "amorphous" goal of remedying societal discrimination).
18
The State and federal courts have widely regarded Justice Powell's
opinion in Bakke as the controlling law. See, e.g., Univ. & Cmty. Coll.
Sys. of Nev. v. Farmer, 930 P.2d 730 (Nev. 1997); McDonal,d v. Hogness,
598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d
Cir. 1993); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981);
UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Davis v. Halpern, 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991);
Uzzell v. Friday, 592 F. Supp. 1502 (M.D.N.C. 1984); Martin v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 475 F. Supp. 1318 (W.D.N.C. 1979), afj'd, 626
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officials and institutions after Bakke that Justice Powell's
analysis and the Harvard plan were the coherent, if narrow,
common ground for this Court's judgment-and therefore
the law of the land.20 As the U.S. Department of Education
announced to the higher education community, "[t]he Court
affirmed the legality of voluntary affirmative action" in
order to "attain a diverse student body." 21
B. Settled Principles Of Stare Decisis Strongly
Counsel Against Overruling Bakke
Because Bakke has proven to be a landmark decision,
the principles outlined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and
Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), provide a useful
framework for analyzing whether there is any "'special
justification",22 for reconsidering that decision. There is not.
F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980). The Fifth Circuit's contrary decision nearly
twenty years later in HO'f)'Wood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), has
gained few adherents. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233
F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001).
19
See, e.g., Scalia, Commentary, The Disease as Cure: "In Order to Get
Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race.", 1979 Wash U. L.
Q. 147, 148 (describing Powell's opinion as "the law of the land"); Blasi,
Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 Cal. L.
Rev. 21, 30 (1979) (''The Powell opinion is, after all, the key to assessing
the precedential significance of the Bakke decision."); Dixon, Bakke: A
Constitutional Analysis, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 69, 69 (1979) ("The actual 'ruling'
in Bakke, stemming only from Justice Powell's tiebreaking opinion, that
race may be a factor but not the factor in the admissions criteria ... has
acquired wide pragmatic appeal.").
20
Petitioner cites Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994), in which
this Court elected to forego Marks analysis altogether and overrule
Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980), on the merits. Pet. Br. at 28-29.
Bakke has not produced anything like the confusion that followed
Baldasar. In any event, this Court could take that tack in Nichols only
because it was resolved to overrule Baldasar either way. A similar
approach here would require this Court to assume for purposes of
decision that Bakke produced a binding holding, and then consider
whether to overrule it under traditional principles of stare decisis.
21
44 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 58,510 (Oct. 10, 1979).
2'l Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995) (quoting
Ariz. v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,212 (1984)).
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First, intervening decisions of this Court have not left
Bakke "a doctrinal anachronism discounted by society." Id.
at 855. This Court has never questioned the core holding of
Bakke, and indeed has uniformly assumed its continuing
validity.23 Bakke has become a ''long-established precedent
... integrated into the fabric of the law," Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 233, and of our ''national culture," Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
Second, the standards established in Bakke have
proven to be "[]workable," Casey, 505 U.S. at 855, as
demonstrated by a 23-year history of enforcement under
Department of Education regulations. Shortly after Bakke,
the Department undertook a comprehensive reexamination
of its regulations governing higher education admissions
under Title VI.
It concluded that universities could,
"consistent with Bakke and the Department's regulation, ...
[c]onsider race, color, or national origin as a positive factor,
with other factors ... in selecting from among qualified
candidates," and that "[t]he relative weight granted to each
factor is properly determined by institution officials; race,
color or national origin may be accorded greater weight than
other factors." 44 Fed. Reg. at 58,510. The Department has
reaffirmed its regulations and guidance many times over the
past two decades and :five presidential administrations, and
has used the standards established in Bakke as an effective,
workable framework for the enforcement of Title VI in both
23

See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 218-19, 224-25 (describing adoption of
intermediate scrutiny in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547
(1990), as a "surprising turn" from the use of strict scrutiny in decisions
such as Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267,286,288 n* (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part)
(recognizing that this Court's affirmative action cases reveal a ''fair
measure of consensus," including that ''the promotion of racial diversity
has been found sufficiently 'compelling,' at least in the context of higher
education, to support the use of racial considerations in furthering that
interest"); Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 568; id. at 619, 621, 625 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987)
(upholding gender-based affirmative action policy, and drawing a
favorable analogy to the Harvard plan).
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admissions and financial aid.24 Although the United States
remarkably fails to mention its regulations or policy
interpretations in its brief, all of them remain in force and
none would be constitutional if Bakke is overruled.25
Third, Bakke could not be overruled ''without serious
inequity to those who have relied upon it." Casey, 505 U.S.
at 855. Over the past twenty-five years, universities and
professional schools, public and private, have made
countless decisions about their faculty hiring, physical plant,
capital spending and curriculum in reliance on this Court's
assurance that they would not be forced to a stark choice
between racial diversity and radically lower academic
standards and ambitions. The State legislators and private
donors who fund these institutions have chosen to support
them instead of countless other worthy causes because, in
part, they are both racially integrated and committed to
academic excellence.26 If Bakke is overruled, the Law
School will have to become a very different kind of
institution than it, its philanthropic donors, and the State of
Michigan have worked so hard to build.
Finally, overruling Bakke would cause "significant
damage to the stability of the society governed by it."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 855. Overruling Bakke would force this
Nation's elite and selective institutions of higher education,
public and private, to an immediate choice between dramatic
24

See, e.g., 56 Fed. Reg. 64,548 (Dec. IO, 1991) (applying Bakke to
financial aid); 59 Fed. Reg. 8756 (Feb. 23, 1994) (same); see also CAJA 787
(Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae).
25
The race-conscious admissions policies employed by the United States
at its own universities, the military academies, would also be
unconstitutional under petitioner's reasoning. See Brief for Lt. Gen.
Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as Amicus Curiae.
26
State legislatures must, for example, constantly choose between
distributing limited resources evenly across an array of relatively nonselective institutions designed to bring the benefits of higher education to
the greatest number of citizens, or disproportionately funding a selective
flagship research institution. States like California, Michigan, North
Carolina and Virginia that have historically chosen the latter course
might reasonably conclude that they can no longer justify it if the flagship
institution can no longer admit a significant number of minority students.
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resegregation and abandoning academic selectivity. If they
chose to maintain academic standards, the representation of
African-American students at the 89 most selective law
schools would fall from approximately 7% now to less than
1%. Three-quarters of the African-American students who
are currently admitted to accredited law schools would not
be accepted anywhere, and 40% of those still admitted would
be admitted only to schools with predominantly minority
student populations.27 Those predictions are confirmed by
experience. In the year after the Fifth Circuit prohibited
the University of Texas Law School from considering race
in its admissions process, for example, Hispanic admissions
fell by 33% and African-American admissions fell by 86%to four students, out of a class of about 500.28
As the United States recognizes (U.S. Br. at 16), if
higher education is not "broadly inclusive to our diverse
national community, then the top jobs, graduate schools and
the professions will be closed to some." Yet a decision to
overrule Bakke would cut the minority lawyers currently
being trained by half or three-quarters, resulting in the
near-complete absence of minority students from the schools
that train most of our federal judges, prosecutors and law
clerks (to say nothing of the new lawyers at our country's
leading law firrns).29 That is a chilling prospect. As our
country becomes increasingly racially diverse, the public
confidence in law enforcement and legal institutions so
essential to the coherence and stability of our society will be
27

See Wightman, The Threat to Di,versity in Legal Education: An
Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor
in Law School Admission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 27-28 (1997);
CA.TA 2254-56 (Bok) (discussing Wightman's findings).
28
JA 209. Texas has increased these numbers marginally in recent
years, but has not achieved meaningful diversity. And the strategies it
employs are neither race-neutral nor a realistic option for the Law School.
See, e.g., Brief for American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae.
29
Nearly 600 of this Court's 824 judicial clerks since 1980 were
graduates of just six of these law schools (including the Law School).
There would be serious negative consequences at the state government
level as well. See Brief for Arizona State University College of Law.
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difficult to maintain if the segments of the bench and bar
currently filled by graduates of those institutions again
become a preserve for white graduates, trained in isolation
from the communities they will serve.
C. Educational Experience,
Social Science
Research, And Common Sense Confirm That
Diversity Has Compelling Educational Benefits
This Court recognized long before Bakke that preparing
students for work and citizenship in our diverse society is
exceedingly difficult in racially homogenous classrooms and
on racially segregated campuses. In Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629, 634 (1950), this Court held that Heman Sweatt
could not receive an equal legal education at a law school
which "excludes from its student body members of the racial
groups which number 85% of the population of the State and
include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be
dealing." Id. "The law school, the proving ground for legal
learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from
the individuals and institutions with which the law
interacts."
Id.
This Court has aclmowledged the
educational benefits of a diverse student body repeatedly
since then. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95
& n.11 (1954); Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457,
472 (1982) ("[I]t should be equally clear that white as well as
Negro children benefit from exposure to 'ethnic and racial
diversity in the classroom."') (citation omitted). And those
conclusions have been confirmed by congressional findings,
educational experience, social science, and common sense.
1. Congress has repeatedly made specific findings that
"elimination of racial isolation has significant educational
benefits," even in the absence of any prior discrimination or
remedial purpose, when authorizing federal financial
assistance for local school districts seeking to eliminate both
de jure and merely de facto segregation in their schools.30
30

See Emergency School Aid Act, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 701-720, 86
Stat. 354 (1972); Magnet Schools Assistance Program, Pub. L. No. 98-377,
§§ 701-712, 98 Stat. 1299 (1984).
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The legislative history reveals Congress's firm conclusion
that "racially integrated education improves the quality of
education for all children," H.R. Rep. No. 92-576, at 10
(1971), and that "[e]ducation in an integrated environment,
in which children are exposed to diverse backgrounds, is
beneficial to both" white and minority students, S. Rep. No.
92-61, at 7 (1971). The recently enacted No Child Left
Behind Act of 2001 reaffirmed Congress's findings that "[i]t
is in the best interests of the United States ... to continue
the Federal Government's support of local educational
agencies that are ... voluntarily seeking to foster meaningful
interaction among students of different racial and ethnic
backgrounds ...."31
2. These findings, which reflect the longstanding
conviction of the United States government on a set of
critically important issues of fact and national policy, were
also supported by a powerful and essentially uncontested
evidentiary record in this case.32 The United States filed an
amicus curiae brief in the district court summarizing the
social science research, and concluding that diversity "in the
higher education context improves students' education,
racial understanding, cultural awareness, cognitive
development and leadership skills." CAJA 803. In its filing
in this Court, the United States repeatedly emphasized its
belief that educational diversity is an "important goal[],''
U.S. Br. at 8, and that keeping undergraduate and graduate
institutions open to ''people of all races and ethnicities" is "a
paramount government objective." Id. at 13.
That belief does not depend on "crude stereotypes." Pet.
Br. at 38. It simply acknowledges the elephant in the
room-that despite the recent advent of formal equality
under the law and indisputable progress in race relations (in
part because of the growing racial diversity in institutions
31

Pub. L. No. 107~110, § 5301(a)(4)(A), 115 Stat. 1425, 1806 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7231).
32
See generally, e.g., CAJA 2240-709 (expert reports), 5617-23 and 564142 (Syverud reports), 7515-18 (Lempert testimony), 7699-706 (Syverud
testimony), 7749 (Lehman testimony).
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like the Law School), America remains both highly
segregated by race and profoundly and constantly aware of
its significance in our society. Many white Americans
underestimate those realities because, of course, "[t]o be
born white is to be free from confronting one's race on a
daily, personal, interaction-by-interaction basis."
By
contrast, "[t]o be born black is to know an unchangeable fact
about oneself that matters every day."33 The evidence for
that fact, anecdotal and scientific, is beyond serious dispute.
The House Judiciary Committee recently found that:
millions of African-Americans and Hispanics alter
their driving habits in ways that would never occur
to most white Americans. Some completely avoid
places like all-white suburbs, where they fear police
harassment for looking "out of place." Some
intentionally drive only bland cars or change the way
they dress. Others who drive long distances even
factor in extra time for the traffic stops that seem
inevitable.34
African-American men are asked to pay almost twice the
markup that white men are asked to pay for automobiles.35
Recent studies have shown dramatic disparities in the
treatment of whites and African-Americans trying to rent an
apartment over the telephone (most people can identify a
caller's race by dialect and the sound of their voice).36
The issue is much more complex and subtle than just the
unfortunate persistence of widespread racial discrimination.
33

Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1060,
1066 (1991).
34
House Judiciary Committee, Traffic Stops Statistics Study Act of
2000, H.R. Rep. No. 106-517, at 3-4 (2000); see also id. at 4-5 (noting that
in some jurisdictions African-American drivers are five to twenty-one
times more likely to be subject to traffic stops than are white drivers).
35
Ayres & Siegelman, Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining
for a New Car, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 304, 313 (June 1995).
36 See, e.g., Baugh, Racial Identification by Speech, 75 Am. Speech 36264 (2000); Massey & Lundy, Use of Black English and Racial
Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets: New Methods and Findings,
36 Urban Affairs Rev. 452,461 (Mar. 2001).
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Stereotypes and unthinking assumptions about social roles
pervasively influence daily life. The Dean of the School of
Education at Berkeley, who is Hispanic, testified in this case
that when he was cutting the grass in front of his own house,
a neighbor approached him to ask what he charges for yard
work. CAJA 8472. And the renowned historian John Hope
Franklin testified that "in recent years he has been
approached more than once by a white person in a hotel
lobby or private club who asked him to fetch her coat or car."
Pet. App. 267a.
Minority students draw as wide a range of conclusions
from experiences like these, and from the ideas they have
been exposed to, as white students do from their own lives
and influences. The Law School's minority students are, like
its white students, liberals and conservatives,
communitarians and libertarians, devotees of both Mill and
Kant. But the presence of persons who have had such
experiences enriches the educational environment, if only
because it is human nature to undervalue or fail to see
burdens that we haven't truly experienced ourselves. 37
3. The importance of these differences in lived
experience is particularly trenchant in the context of legal
education. The legal system is the epicenter of our Nation's
ongoing struggle to overcome racial divisions that persist in
our society. Indeed, monitoring and mediating the progress
of that struggle has become one of the most important jobs
of the federal courts. Discrimination suits under Titles VI,
37

These lessons cannot be learned from books, or by lecture in a racially
homogenous classroom. Dean Syverud testified that "the best active,
Socratic teaching'' provokes "direct and often painful dialogue between
students who are forced by the method to confront and make explicit
their deepest unexamined convictions about legal issues." CAJA 5619.
As Dean Lehman explained, that classroom dynamic does not "work□
really, really well" unless its participants are "drawing on a broad range
of backgrounds and experiences which are personal." Id. at 7747. Dean
Syverud testified that racial heterogeneity improves the classroom
dynamic even in classes ''far removed from issues traditionally associated
with race" such as insurance, id. at 5622, and that he has been unable to
"recreate the dynamic of a diverse Socratic classroom" in racially
homogenous classes. Id. at 7710-11.
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VII and IX, ongoing school desegregation cases, Voting
Rights Act enforcement and racial-profiling lawsuits have
all become staples of the case load. What legal consequences
if any should follow from the disparate impact of the
criminal justice system in general, and certain criminal
statutes in particular, on racial minorities is one of the most
oft-debated and important challenges that our society faces.
Against this backdrop, law schools need the autonomy
and discretion to decide that teaching about the role of race
in our society and legal system, and preparing their
students to function effectively as leaders after graduation,
are critically important aspects of their institutional
m1ss10ns. And it hardly requires extensive proof that
pursuit of those goals is greatly enhanced by the presence of
meaningful racial diversity among the law school's student
body-enhanced in ways that white students alone, no
matter what their viewpoints are or even what their
experiences have been, cannot possibly supply.
The presence of minority students is also essential to the
Law School's educational mission in other ways. At its most
successful, the educational process is a productive collision
not only of facts and ideas, but also of people. The Law
School is training lawyers and leaders for a society in which,
within the careers of its current students, white citizens will
become a minority of the population. Those students need
to learn how to bridge racial divides, work sensitively and
effectively with people of different races, and simply
overcome the initial discomfort of interacting with people
visibly different from themselves that is a hallmark of
human nature.38 As then-Provost Condoleezza Rice recently
explained, "differences in talent, in background, in racial and
ethnic identity, in creed" in an educational environment can
open "a small window on perhaps the greatest challenge
38

See CAJA 7909 (Or.field), 310, 2243, 5044, 5106. Dean Lehman
testified that "there are significant numbers of Michigan students who
come to the law school with very little prior contact with people of other
races." Tr. 5:158; see also Tr. 6:116 (Orfield) (half of Michigan students
have no or very little interracial contact prior to Law School).
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before us as human beings-finding a way that people who
are different can live together in peace and move forward
together." Stanford Class Day Speech (June 12, 1999).39
4. Effective pursuit of these goals requires more than
an isolated handful of minority students, for several reasons.
First, the educational benefits of diversity depend on
opportunities for interaction-in classrooms, cafeterias, or
residential settings. The Law School is a large institution,
and a few minority students obviously could not be
everywhere at once, or establish meaningful personal ties
with more than a small fraction of their classmates.
Second, the presence of more than one or two minority
students in a classroom encourages students to think
critically and reexamine stereotypes. Kent Syverud, Dean
of the Vanderbilt Law School, testified that the classroom
"dynamic is different within the class among the students
and between me and the students, when the class is
homogenous" or has a "token minority student" than "when
there are enough minority students ... that there is a
diversity of views and experiences among the minority
students." CA.TA 7698; id. at 5618-20. When there are more
than a token number of minority students, "everybody in
the class starts looking at people as individuals in their
views and experiences, instead of as races/' Id. at 7699.
Third, as the Harvard plan recognized, there is a
powerful body of evidence that very low numbers of
minority students tend to create a "sense of isolation among
the [minority] students themselves" that would "make it
more difficult for them to develop and achieve their
potential." 438 U.S. at 323. That sense of isolation
particularly inhibits the willingness of many minority
students to participate freely in class discussions.40
39

Available on the internet at http://www.stanford.edu/deptJnews/
report/news/june16/classday-616.html
40
See CA.TA 8145-46 (James); Pet. App. 28a; CAJA 432-33, 473; see also,
e.g., United States v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996) (noting district court
finding that 10% female enrollment would be '"a sufficient "critical mass"
to provide the female cadets with a positive educational experience"')
(citation omitted). As a result UCLA School of Law, for example, had to
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D. The Law School's Educational Objectives Are
Sufficiently Compelling To Satisfy Strict
Scrutiny
Petitioners' arguments boil down to the assertion that
only one interest can be characterized as "compelling":
remedying an institution's own past discrimination. But this
Court has steadfastly refused to embrace a rigid
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that would
preclude "case-by-case" scrutiny of the justifications
advanced for the consideration of race in this or any future
case. Croson, 488 U.S. at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part); see also Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part) (recognizing "the possibility that the
Court will find other governmental interests ... to be
sufficiently 'important' or 'compelling' to sustain the use of
affirmative action policies").
As Adarand recently
confirmed, not all decisions influenced by race are "'equally
objectionable"' and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a
framework for "carefully examining" the importance and the
sincerity of the reasons advanced. 515 U.S. at 228 (citation
omitted). Those reasons-while certainly few in numberare potentially as varied and difficult to predict as the
challenges facing our Nation.
By way of example, few would question the State's need
to take race into account when choosing an undercover law
enforcement officer to infiltrate a racially homogenous
terrorist cell, or when acting to quell a race riot in a prison.
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring). Indeed,
this Court has recognized a variety of governmental
interests-from combating corruption to promoting health
and safety-as sufficiently "compelling'' to justify incursions
upon other rights to which strict scrutiny applies and which
decide whether to place one or two_ of the 13 African-American students
in this year's entering class into each of eight first-year sections (which
raises educational concerns related to isolati6n) or to place all those
students into a subset of the sections, creating meaningful diversity there
but leaving the other sections with no African-American students. See
Brief of Amici Curiae UCLA School of Law Students of Color at 15-16.
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are, in their own way, no less weighty than those granted by
the Equal Protection Clause.41
The Law School's interest in achieving the educational
benefits of diversity plainly satisfies the standards set by
this Court. First, race is relevant to a core mission of the
Law School that is vitally important and plainly
''legitimate." Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227-28. Second, the
program does not use racial classifications as a proxy for
other more germane considerations, or in a way that
suggests reliance on impermissible stereotypes that demean
any racial or ethnic group. Id. at 226. Third, the asserted
interest in considering race to achieve the -benefits of
student body diversity has a ''logical stopping point,"
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275, sufficient to ensure that it will not
justify indefinite or unconstrained consideration of race.
1. As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, the Law
School's interest in the educational benefits of a diverse,
racially integrated student body is both unquestionably
legitimate and "of paramount importance in the fulfillment
of its mission." 438 U.S. at 313. The cultivation of a diverse
and vibrant academic environment is the most important
"'business of a university,"' and the selection of students
who will best enrich that environment is one of its "'four
essential freedoms."' Id. at 312 (quoting Sweezy v. N.H., 354
U.S. 234,263 (1957)). Indeed, "[t]he 'nation's future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas
and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples." Id. at 312-13 (Powell, J.) (quoting Keyi,shian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). The Law School's
desire for a diverse student body is at the very core of its
proper institutional mission.42
41

See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (compliance with§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act is a compelling
interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (recognizing compelling
interests in both maternal health and fetal life, at different stages of
pregnancy); Austin v. Mich. Srote Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990) (compelling interest in reducing political corruption).
42
In contrast, the interest in ''broadcast diversity" asserted in Metro
Broadcasting was (at best) on the periphery of the FCC's legitimate
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Indeed, racial diversity is simply far more relevant to
the core mission of a university or professional school than
to virtually any other government endeavor. See Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227 (race is '"in most circumstances irrelevant"'
to governmental action and "'therefore prohibited"')
(quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943)).43 This Court has recognized that universities have
an unparalleled need for pluralism that is essential to the
vitality of our society.44 Although the City of Richmond
could install the finest possible plumbing fixtures in its jail
using an all-white work force, Croson, 488 U.S. at 481-82,
this Court recognized in Sweatt and Bakke that the Law
School cannot provide the finest possible legal education
with a nearly all-white student body.
functions and actually threatened to interfere with important First
Amendment values. 497 U.S. at 616-17 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting).
43
This Court has frequently held that constitutional doctrines must be
flexible enough to accommodate the unique needs of the educational
environment. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southwort,h,
529 U.S. 217, 231-32 (2000) (First Amendment compelled-speech/funding
doctrines modified for academic environments); Regents of Univ. of Mich.
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (due process review of "genuinely
academic decision[s] ... should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment"); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972)
(student speech rights limited by ''the mutual interest of students, faculty
members, and administrators in an environment free from disruptive
interference with the educational process'); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S.
263, 268 (1981) ("A university differs in significant respects from public
forums such as streets or parks or even municipal theaters.').
44
See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (Warren, J.);
id. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-14
(Powell, J.). The Law School's desire for the educational benefits of such
pluralism is not, contrary to Judge Boggs's suggestion, either the moral
or practical equivalent of the rigid Jewish quotas of an earlier era. The
Law School does not have a quota of any kind, infra pp. 38-48, and there is
a world of difference between a policy which strives for some diversity for
educational reasons-and in which white and ·Asian American students
compete for all the seats and consistently receive the overwhelming
majority of them-and one which capped Jewish enrollment at a low,
arbitrary number, dramatically limiting educational opportunities for no
purpose other than expressing animus or disdain for Jews.
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2. The educational interest in a diverse student body
does not employ historic stereotypes, "directly equate race
with belief and behavior," or use race as a poor proxy for
characteristics that could be pursued directly. Metro
Broad., 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Law
School does not premise its need for a racially integrated
student body on any belief that minority students always (or
even consistently) express some characteristic minority
viewpoint on any issue. To the contrary, breaking down
such stereotypes is a crucial part of its mission, and one that
cannot be advanced with only token numbers of minority
students. Supa p. 26. The Law School values the presence
of minority students because they will have direct, personal
experiences that white students cannot-experiences which
are relevant to the Law School's mission. To the extent
there are any proxies at work in the Law School's policy, the
"nexus [is] nearly complete," if not perfect. 497 U.S. at 626
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). 45
The United States reads this Court's cases to hold that
any recognition that members of racial minorities have
relevant ''life experiences" rests on an impermissible
"stereotype." U.S. Br. at 20, 25 n.8. That is plainly
incorrect. This Court has condemned the fiction that race
determines a person's ''belief and behavior"46-not the
inescapable reality that race affects life experiences in our
society. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148-49

45

That nexus is certainly much tighter than in Metro Broadcasting,
where the FCC not only "presume[d) that persons think in a manner
associated with their race," 497 U.S. at 618, but also that they would insist
on disseminating that characteristic ''minority" viewpoint regardless of
market incentives, id. at 626-27.
46
Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 618 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Shaw
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (''think alike"); Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900, 911-12 (1995) (same); United States v. Va., 518 U.S. at 517
(stereotypes are '"fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
[minorities)"' which are '"likely to ... perpetuate historical patterns of
discrimination'') (citations omitted) (omission in original).
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(1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[L]ike race, gender
matters" in one' s "resulting life experience[s]").47
3. As the dissenters applying strict scrutiny in Metro
Broadcasting explained, "[a]n interest capable of justifying
race-conscious measures must be sufficiently specific and
verifiable, such that it supports only limited and carefully
defined uses of racial classifications." 497 U.S. at 613. The
interest in remedying societal discrimination that Justice
Powell rejected as "amorphous" in Bakke itself, 438 U.S. at
307, and in Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, plainly failed that test. 48
Because no individual employer or educational institution
could hope to actually remedy societal discrimination, the
enormity of that challenge would justify consideration of
race without any ''logical stopping point."49
As Justice Powell recognized, the Law School's interest
in achieving the educational benefits of racial diversity in its
classrooms is entirely different. Precisely because those
benefits are educational, any program that genuinely seeks
to obtain them is constrained by its own logic and by other
47

As the United States itself explained in an amicus brief to this Court in
Hopwood at 16 (No. 95-1773), the fact that a minoritY. "student reared in
this country is likely to have had different life experiences, precisely
because of his or her race" does not ''rest on impermissible stereotypes;
... equate race with particular viewpoints; ... [or] presume that all
individuals of a particular race act or think alike." (Emphasis added.)
48
Petitioner's suggestion (Pet. Br. at 34) that the "role model"
justification forwarded in Wygant was directed at "educational benefits"
is simply incorrect. The school board in Wygant expressed a desire to
produce minority role models "as an attempt to alleviate the effects of
societal discrimination." 476 U.S. at 274. As Justice O'Connor recognized,
that objective "should not be confused with the very different goal of
promoting racial diversity among the faculty" for educational reasonswhich was not asserted in Wygant. 476 U.S. at 288 n. *.
49
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 275 (Powell, J.). The FCC's asserted interest in
''broadcast diversity" in Metro Broadcasting was similarly untethered,
because the FCC could not "suggest how one would define or measure a
particular viewpoint that might be associated with race, or even how one
would assess the diversity of broadcast viewpoints." 497 U.S. at 614
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). The interest therefore threatened to justify
unlimited regulation of broadcasting to produce whatever mix of
purportedly "racial" viewpoints the FCC chose to identify and favor.
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pressing educational goals. It would be inconsistent with a
sincere pursuit of those benefits, for example, to admit
minority students who are unprepared to ''be the
intellectual peers of their fellows in the classroom," and
whose presence would detract from, rather than enhance,
the learning environment. CAJA 7756 (Lehman). Those
benefits can justify the Harvard plan's modest and flexible
"attention to numbers," but not racial balancing of any
kind-which Justice Powell famously condemned as
"discrimination for its own sake." 438 U.S. at 307.50 And, as
Justice Powell explained in depth in Bakke, it would be
inconsistent with a genuine interest in the educational
benefits of racial diversity not to constantly weigh that
interest against other academic goals-including the
educational benefits of other kinds of diversity. 438 U.S. at
315-16. Taken seriously, the educational benefits of racial
diversity justify only an individualized admissions system
along the lines of the Harvard plan.
Finally, petitioner argues that an interest in educational
diversity cannot be recognized as compelling because it
would "give the Nation its first permanent justification for
racial preferences." Pet. Br. at 33. The argument rests on
an unspoken premise that should not be countenanced. The
Law School of course recognizes that race-conscious
programs must have reasonable durational limits, and the
Sixth Circuit properly found such a limit in the Law School's
resolve to cease considering race when genuine race-neutral
alternatives become available. Pet. App. 38a; JA 121; CAJA
50

As explained above, "critical mass" is an educational concept and the
range of overall minority enrollments likely to produce it is not "a matter
for mystical and metaphysical inquiry," Pet. Br. at 31, but a
straightforward inference from the Law School's desire to have, for
example, more than one or two African-American and Hispanic students
in a typical small section. Supra p. 6 & n. 7. That number is not based on
the percentage of minorities in the population or the applicant pool. The
Law School's minority enrollment percentages do not correlate with
Michigan's population, see Respondents' Br. in Gratz v. Bollinger at 48
n.68, and diverged from the percentages in the applicant pool by as much
as 17.7%from 1995-2000. SeeJA 156-203; CAJA 1536, 5584, 5586.
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7750-51. The disparities in academic preparation that make
such alternatives impossible today are rooted in centuries of
racial discrimination. The district court found that these
disparities will eventually be eliminated as our society
"invest[s] greater educational resources in currently
underperforming primary and secondary school systems."
Pet. App. 291a. Any assumption that they are inevitably
"permanent" merely because three decades of modest effort
have not yet erased them should not be dignified with a
place in our constitutional jurisprudence.
II. THE LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICIES
ARE NARROWLY TAILORED
A. There Are No Race-Neutral Alternatives
Capable Of Producing A Diverse Student Body
Without Abandoning Academic Selectivity

Petitioner and the United States assert that there are
race-neutral alternatives available to the Law School.51
Many of the ideas they present are not genuinely raceneutral, and all are demonstrably unworkable . or would
substitute a different institutional mission for the one that
the Law School has chosen.52 The Law School has studied
51

Petitioner also argues that, apart from whether race-neutral
alternatives actually exist, the district court ''found" that the Law School
did not in fact consider them. AI!y such finding would be clearly
erroneous (although review should in fact be de novo because the issue
was decided on summary judgment, not at trial, see CAJA 99). As the
Sixth Circuit properly recognized, Pet. App. 33a-34a, the record
establishes beyond question that the Law School did consider, and
implement, a wide variety of race-neutral recruiting and outreach
strategies before and after its adoption of the 1992 policy. See also CAJA
401, 358, 7754-55, 7667-78. The district court actually faulted the Law
School officials only for failing to write memos to the file about or
"experiment with" options (such as lotteries, percentage plans, and
lowering academic standards, see Pet. App. 251a) that obviously could not
work without serious injury to the Law School's other legitimate and
central educational goals. That was an error of law. Infra p. 34 n.53.
52
The United States touts the minority enrollments in Florida's
"graduate, medical, and business schools." U.S. Br. at 16. As the dean of
Levin College of Law at the University of Florida recently explained,
race-conscious scholarships have been "crucial" to its (limited) success.
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this issue for many years, and would like nothing better
than to find a race-neutral admissions formula that would
produce meaningful diversity without doing unacceptable
damage to its other educational goals. Steady improvement
in the quantitative credentials of the minority applicant pool
will make such alternatives possible.
At this point,
however, every race-blind alternative requires a dramatic
sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all admitted
students, or both. 53
Recruiting and outreach. The Law School already
engages in significant recruiting and outreach activities
targeted at minority applicants, but such efforts have never
proven sufficient to enroll a critical mass of minority
students without the consideration of race in admissions.
CAJA 401, 7668-70. Given the small size of the pool of
highly qualified potential applicants nationwide, and the
recruiting efforts already directed at them by the Law
School and its peers, such efforts have largely become a
zero-sum competition. They are also not "race-neutral."
"Percentage Plans."
The United States touts
admissions policies adopted recently by the public
undergraduate institutions in Texas, Florida and California,
which guarantee admission to all students above a certain
class-rank threshold in every high school in the State.
There are serious and well-documented problems with that
approach even for undergraduate schools.54 But the United
States does not even attempt to articulate how such a
program could work for graduate and professional schools.
Mills, Di,versity in Law Schools: Where Are We Headed in the TwentyFirst Century?, 33 U. Toi. L. Rev.119, 129 (2001).
53
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (alternatives must serve the interest
"'about as well"' and "'at tolerable administrative expense"') (citations
omitted); Croson, 488 US at 509-10 (city had a ''whole array of raceneutral" alternatives because changing requirements with a disparate
impact ''would have [had] little detrimental effect on the city's [other]
interests'').
54
The issue is more relevant to Gratz v. Bollinger, and is dealt with in
greater detail in the University's brief in that case. See also Brief for
American Law Deans Association as Amicus Curiae.
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No elite law school could responsibly assemble a class
by guaranteeing admission to every applicant who had
secured a high grade point average in college, without
regard to the institution or course of study. Moreover, such
an approach could not produce meaningful diversity. The
Law School draws from a national pool and is too small to
guarantee admission to even a tiny percentage of graduates
from every university in the country. At the universities
from which it currently draws the vast majority of its
students, minorities make up no more than around 3% of the
students graduating in the top five or ten percent by GPA.55
The only way to produce a diverse, racially integrated class
at the law school level through a ''percentage plan" would be
to limit and gerrymander the undergraduate institutions
allowed to participate, such that an artificial proportion of
them were highly segregated majority-minority schools.
That is not race-neutral. If affirmative action for minority
students is unconstitutional, then affirmative action for
minority colleges would be a thin and cynical proxy that
would be vulnerable under cases like ViUage of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing DevelO]Yment Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Indeed, that vulnerability points up a deeper problem
with the percentage plans at any level of higher education.
The Law School's current admissions policy considers race
only as one factor among many, in an effort to assemble a
student body that is diverse in ways much broader and
richer than race. Because a percentage plan makes that
kind of nuanced judgment impossible, it effectively sacrifices
all other educational values-including every other kind of
diversity. By subordinating traditional admissions criteria
to a single-minded focus on race, these plans make race the
"predominant factor" in the design of the entire admissions
system. E.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,547 (1999).
Abandon academic selectivity. The United States
repeatedly suggests that the Law School "eas[e] admissions
55

Bowen & Rudenstine, Race-Sensitive Admissions: Back to Basics,
Chron. Higher Educ., Feb. 7, 2003, at B7, B9.
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requirements for all students," and "discard facially neutral
criteria that, in practice, tend to skew admissions in a
manner that detracts from educational diversity." U.S. Br.
at 13-14. Those are in fact the same recommendation, since
the only facially neutral criteria that the Law School
considers that have a significant disparate impact on
minority candidates are academic in nature.
As the grids and the chart at JA 219 demonstrate, the
difficulty with such proposals is the composition of the
applicant pool. There are so many more white and Asian
American applicants throughout the upper and middle score
ranges that no incremental lowering of standards will create
a pool with meaningful racial diversity. Setting the bar so
low that academic criteria are nearly irrelevant might allow
a lottery (or academic-blind subjective review) to produce a
racially diverse class, but any such plan would require the
Law School to become a very different institution, and to
sacrifice a core part of its educational mission.
Socio-economic criteria. The Law School already
considers the light that a history of overcoming poverty or
disadvantage may shed on every applicant's likely
contributions. But if petitioner is suggesting that the Law
School could enroll a critical mass of minority students by
giving even greater weight to socio-economic criteria in an
honestly race-blind manner, the problem is, again, the facts.
There is a strong correlation between race and poverty
in our country. Nonetheless, there are still many more poor
white students than poor minority students in the pool from
which the Law School draws. "[T]here are almost six times
as many white students as black students who both come
from [low socio-economic status] families and have test
scores that are above the threshold for gaining admission to
an academically selective college or university."56 Again, this
is not a way the Law School could enroll an academically
talented class that is diverse in many ways, including race.
Boalt Hall recently experimented with admitting more low56

Shape of the River 51; see generally id. at 46-52.
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income students but abandoned that experiment after one
year, concluding that it could not produce racial diversity. 57
"Experiential diversity." Finally, petitioner and the
United States suggest that the Law School focus its
admissions process on identifying those students, without
regard to race, who have had the particular experiences and
perspectives that the Law School regards as uniquely
salient to its academic mission. That suggestion simply
elides the central question, which is whether the Law School
would still be permitted to consider "the experience of being
an African-American, Hispanic or Native American in a
society where race matters." Pet. App. 35a. If not, this
proposal could not produce meaningful racial diversity,
supa pp. 5-6, yet it would deny minority students the
opportunity to have their own backgrounds and experiences
"weighed fairly" in the admissions process.58 If so, it is not
clear how the proposal would differ from what the Law
School currently does. As Dean Lehman testified, "the
extent to which we take race and ethnicity into account is
actually going to vary by individual. And it's going to
depend on the admissions file, and what they say in their
essays about who they are, and the extent to which race is
part [of1 their experiences." CAJA 7755.
In its efforts to assemble a broadly diverse class, the
Law School already looks for minority applicants who say
interesting things about the ways that race has, or has not,
influenced their lives. It would not, however, endorse an
57

Moran, Dfoersity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action
at Boalt Hall, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 2241, 2247-48 (2000).
58
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (Powell, J.). As the Sixth Circuit recognized, a
focus on "experiential diversity" that willfully ignores experiences
associated with race would produce "a narrowed and inferior version of
the academic diversity currently sought by the Law School." Pet. App.
34a-35a. Judge Boggs's dissent offered no real response, other than
skepticism that "an experience with [racial] discrimination" was really "so
much more important than any other experience germane to other legal
issues." Id. at 120a. As this Court has recognized, "[i]t is not for the
Court to say what is or is not germane to the ideas to be pursued in an
institution of higher learning." Southwonh, 529 U.S. at 232.

38
admissions system that could consider the unique
contributions that minority applicants can make to the
educational environment only if they describe their
experiences as "'victims' of discrimination," Pet. Br. at 37.
As Gerhard Casper recently put it when explaining his
support for race-conscious admissions programs at Stanford
and other selective universities: "[i]n order to survive as a
sane society, we should not create incentives for ever more
people to think in terms of victimhood or to play the role of
victims, or to suggest that one must be disadvantaged to be
given serious consideration in the college admissions
process." Casper, Statement on Affirmative Action at
Stanford University (Oct. 4; 1995).59
B. The Law School Does Not Employ Quotas Or
Set-Asides
Petitioner and her amici repeatedly charge that the
Law School's admissions process employs a "quota" or
"effectively reserves" a minimum of 10-12% of the class for
minority applicants. That accusation may be an error of law
or of fact (their arguments are too vague to discern which),
but either way the error is a plain one. If the import of their
argument is that the structure of the Law School's actual
policy renders it a "quota" as a matter of law, their use of
that word in this context is a disguised assault on its
accepted meaning. If petitioner's contention is that the Law
School is secretly operating a true rigid minimum "quota" as
that term has been understood until now, that is not a
permissible inference from the record.
1. As the United States correctly explains, "[i]t has
long been established that, even where the Constitution
permits consideration of race, it generally forbids the use of
racial quotas." U.S. Br. at 22. A quota is a policy in which a
certain fixed number or proportion of opportunities are
"reserved exclusively for certain minority groups." Croson,
488 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J.). Quotas "'impose a fixed
number or percentage which must be attained, or which
59
Available on the internet at http://www.stanford.edu/dept/presprovostJpresidentJspeeches/951004affaction.html
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cannot be exceeded,",oo and "insulate the individual from
comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats.',s1 By contrast, "a permissible goal ... require[s] only
a good-faith effort ... to come within a range demarcated by
the goal itself,',s2 and permits consideration of race (or
gender) as a "plus factor'' in any given case while still
ensuring that each candidate "compete[s] with all other
qualified applicants.''63 This Court's affirmative action cases
frequently invoke, and often turn on, that distinction
between illegal quotas and permissible goals; it has also
been incorporated into the extensive regulations governing
affirmative action in federal contracting.64
The seminal case for that distinction is in many ways
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, which contrasted UCDavis's rigid 16-seat quota with Harvard's more flexible use
of race as a plus factor. Harvard certainly had minimum
goals for minority enrollment even if it . had no specific
number firmly in mind. See 438 U.S. at 323 ("10 or 20 black
students could not begin to bring to their classmates and to
60

Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,
495 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concuning in part and dissenting in part)
(citation omitted).
61
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J .); see also id. at 305, 319.
62
Sheet Metal Workers, 478 U.S. at 495 (O'Connor, J., concuning in part
and dissenting in part).
63
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 638 (1987); see also id. at 656
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (permitting use of gender as a "plus factor'' to
achieve a stated numerical goal, as long as quotas are avoided and the
£iolicy does not "automatically and blindly'' promote women over men).
See generally Brief for the Respondents, Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Mineta (No. 00-730) (Aug. 10, 2001); 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.16(e)(l)
("Placement goals may not be rigid and inflexible quotas, which must be
met, nor are they to be considered as either a ceiling or a floor for the
employment of particular groups. Quotas are expressly forbidden."); id.
§ 60-2.16(e)(3); id. § 60-2.16(a); Office of Legal Counsel, Department of
Justice, Legal Guidance on the Implications of the Supreme Court's
Decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (June 28, 1995) ("PostCroson affirmative action programs in contracting and procurement tend
to employ flexible numerical goals and/or bidding preferences in which
race or ethnicity is a 'plus' factor in the allocation decision, rather than a
hard set-aside of the sort at issue in Croson.").
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each other the variety of points of view, backgrounds and
experiences of blacks in the United States"). And Justice
Powell clearly rejected the suggestion that Harvard's policy
was ''the functional equivalent of a quota" merely because it
gave some "plus" for race, or greater ''weight" to race than
to some other factors, in order to achieve diversity.65 The
Law School's "virtually indistinguishable" policy therefore
cannot sensibly be labeled a "quota," at least with regard to
its design. It is the paradigmatic awosite of a quota as that
term has been understood until now. Recharacterizing the
Harvard plan as an illegal quota would overrule not just
Bakke but also cases like Johnson-and would render every
affirmative action program nationwide unconstitutional.
2. Assuming that petitioner and the United States do
not intend such a radical break with settled law, their
position must be that the Law School is secretly operating a
true, rigid minimum quota (in the ordinary, understood
sense). That is not a permissible inference from the record.
First, Dean Lehman and the other school officials
uniformly denied that extraordinary accusation.
The
district court also expressly held that they devised and
implemented the policy in a good faith effort to comply with
Bakke and are therefore entitled to qualified immunity-a
holding that cannot be reconciled with any suggestion that
they were in fact covertly defying both their own admissions
policy and well-settled law. Pet. App. 252a-54a. That
finding has not been challenged in this Court, and the only
actual facts identified by petitioner and her supporters as
supporting their extraordinary "quota" accusation are all
fully consistent with faithful adherence to the written policy.
65

438 U.S. at 317-18. Instead, Justice Powell explained that a system
based on a "quota" or its ''functional equivalent" involves a "prescribed
number" of spaces for minorities or the "total exclu[sion]" of
nonrninorities from consideration ''from a specified percentage [of spaces)
... [n]o matter how strong their qualifications." Id. at 315-19; see also id.
at 318 n.52; Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 (flexible programs are ''less
problematic from an equal protection standpoint because they treat all
candidates individually rather than making the color of an applicant's skin
the sole relevant consideration").
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Second, petitioner, her amici, the district court, and the
Sixth Circuit dissenters all claimed to see some type of
"quota" in the Law School's enrollment numbers, but it is
telling that they still cannot agree on what that quota is.66
They also gerrymander the years chosen in order to make
that range appear tighter than the facts actually showentering classes with 42 to 73 minority students between
1993 and 2000.67 The statistical law of large numbers
guarantees that there will be a stable range, with a bottom
identifiable in retrospect, for any characteristic-whether
the admissions process cares about it or not.68 If the Law
School conducted an entirely race-blind process there would
still be a range, with a bottom that skeptical observers like
petitioner could mistake for a quota. 69
66

Petitioner suggests the "quota" was 10-12%. Pet. 10. Judge Boggs'
dissenting opinion claimed it was "around 13.5%." Pet. App. 142a. The
district court variously suggested that it was 11-17%, id. at 225a, up to
19.2%, id. at 226a n.26, and 10-17%, id. at 229a-30a.
67
CA.TA 1536 (1993-98); Record 346, Tr.Exh. 149 at 21, 23 (1999-00).
Both Judge Boggs (Pet. App.14la-42a) and the United States (U.S. Br. at
7) focus on the fact that the total number of minority students varied only
slightly between 1995 and 1998. But, as Judge Boggs conceded (Pet. App.
142a n.29), outside of that arbitrary window the 1992 policy produced
iuite substantial variation. See id. at 30a (13.5 to 20% overall).
By way of comparison, the proportion of students at the Law School
with last names beginning with "C" in the years from 1999 to 2002 turned
out to be 6.4%, 6.6%, 6.5%, and 6.4%. The United States also notes (U.S.
Br. at 15) that African-American enrollment at the University of Texas
has varied between 3% and 4% in recent years-but apparently does not
see in that narrow range the operation of a secret quota, even though the
top-10% plan covers only about half of its admissions process and thus
leaves room for discretion. See also id. at 16 n.5 ("System-wide minority
enrollment [in Florida] will remain steady at approximately 36%.").
69
Contrary to petitioner's suggestion, the district court did not make a
factual "finding'' that the Law School's policy reserves a certain number
(or range) of seats for minority students. See Pet. App. 248a ("the law
school has not set aside a fixed number of seats''). It instead concluded as
a matter of law that ''there is no principled difference between a fixed
number of seats" and the practical effect of the Law School's policy
described above-which the district court characterized as "an essentially
fixed minimum percentage figure." Id. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the
district court's finding that the Law School's policy would, as a practical
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Third, the Law School's hope that its admissions policy
will produce a critical mass of minority students does not
make that policy a quota. As the Harvard plan recognized,
there is of course "some relationship between numbers and
achieving the benefits to be derived from a diverse student
body, and between numbers and providing a reasonable
environment for those students admitted." 438 U.S. at 323.
If the Law School did not pay attention to these educational
concerns, then its policy would not be narrowly tailored to
the interests it seeks to promote. But "some attention to
numbers" does not transform a :flexible admissions system
into a rigid quota.
Petitioner and the United States emphasize snippets of
testimony from various witnesses indicating that a critical
mass would probably be achieved with tolerable frequency
when total minority enrollments fall within 10 and 20%.
Even if those numbers are taken to express the Law
School's official goal (contrary to its written policy and the
uniform testimony of those very same witnesses), they
would still be just that: aspirational goals, not quotas.
The Law School's desire for a "critical mass" of students
from otherwise underrepresented minority groups is only
one of many educational goals pursued through the
admissions policy, and it is at all times weighed against
other educational objectives. Dean Lehman and the other
trial witnesses testified unequivocally that the Law School
would and does regularly reject qualified minority
matter, produce some concrete range of minority enrollments over time.
Id. at 29a (Proper consideration of race will "over time ... always produce
some percentage range of minority enrollment. And that range will
always have a bottom, which, of course, can be labeled the 'minimum.'").
The Sixth Circuit disagreed only with the district court's conclusion that
there is no "principled" (i.e., legal) difference between a policy with that
effect and a rigid set-aside. Id. at 24a, 29a-32a. Compare Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 41 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 476 (1982) (concluding
that affirmative action program created an "absolute bar" to male
employee's promotion) with Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38 (reviewing de
novo and concluding that no candidates were "automatically excluded
from consideration").
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candidates, even if that risks falling short of a critical mass,
because it believes that assembling a class with exceptional
academic promise is even more valuable, or because it
concludes that particular white or Asian American
candidates will bring other things to the educational
environment that are, on balance, even more intriguing and
valuable. See supra pp. 8-9. Petitioner offers no evidence
that even tends to confirm her charge that the Law School's
desire for a critical mass is instead an inflexible quota. 70
Petitioner's argument ultimately boils down to a claim
that any plus program generating a range of minority
admissions for which the bottom in hindsight approaches a
meaningful level of racial diversity should be presumed to
mask a "secret" quota. If a court were permitted to draw
that inference from the record in this case, then every
honest Bakke program would be challenged in court on the
same grounds-and institutions like the Law School could
avoid losing only by manipulating the process to produce,
every few years, a class with very few minority students.
C. The Law School's Consideration Of Race Is
Individualized, Competitive, Modest In Scope,
And Does Not Impose An Undue Burden On
Non-Minority Applicants
Petitioner's brief points to various statistical measures
of academic qualifications and odds of admission, and
concludes that the Law School employs a "plus factor" that .
is too large. That is not truly a narrow tailoring argument
at all. Narrow tailoring scrutiny of the size of a ''plus factor"
70
The fact that the Law School's database kept track of (among other
things) the racial composition of the developing class, and included that
data on periodic reports, suggests nothing inappropriate. The Law School
is required to track the racial composition of its student body and report
it to the Department of Education, see 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(b); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1094(a)(l7), and to the ABA as part of the accreditation process, see
ABA Accreditation Standards Interpretation 101-1 (1996). In addition,
Bakke authorizes admissions officers to pay "some attention to numbers,"
438 U.S. at 323, and the Law School's admissions officers testified without
contradiction that they never gave race any more or less weight based on
information in these reports in any event. CAJA 7336.
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must be focused on the questions to which that issue is
genuinely relevant: the closeness of the ''fit" between
means and ends, and the burden imposed on innocent
parties. The Law School's policy satisfies both standards.
1. It is important to recognize at the outset that the
statistical measures relied upon by petitioner cannot bear
the weight that she places on them. Differences in average
or median scores are unrevealing for reasons already
explained. Supra p. 9 n.12~ Petitioner's probabilities and
"odds ratios"71 within individual cells on her admissions
grids (or at a given index score) certainly establish some
attention to race, but are inherently incapable of measuring
its weight. Because applicants within each cell have (by
definition) identical quantitative qualifications, even a very
modest ''tie-brealdng'' plus factor would often produce
enormous differences in probabilities or relative odds
ratios.72 In addition, the composite relative-odds ratios (Pet.
Br. at 9) are highly misleading because this methodology
required petitioner's statistician to exclude all of the cells (a
majority of the total) in which white and minority applicants
were treated the same.73 A methodology that would
quantify even a tie-breaking plus factor as an "enormous"
one and exclude all data that reflects equal treatment is
simply not useful to the constitutional inquiry.74
2. The bulk of petitioner's narrow tailoring argument
proceeds as if a "plus factor'' is automatically
71

"Odds ratios" do not mean the same thing as the "probability" of
admission. For example, petitioner's statistician explained that an odds
ratio of 81 means that an applicant was nine times as likely to be
admitted. Tr. 2:121-23.
72
CA.JA 7625-28 (Raudenbush). Petitioner's statistician conceded the
accuracy of this observation. See id. at 7469-70, 8597-99, 7466-67.
73
CA.JA 7456-58, 7613-14. In 1995, for example, this methodology
resulted in the exclusion of almost 40% of the minority admissions
decisions from the analysis. CA.JA 8603-05, 8982, 8595. Indeed,
petitioner's statistician found statistically significant differences in rates
of admission only for 21 of the 240 cells in 1995. Tr. 2:143.
74
The district court approved of the Larntz methodology, Pet. App. at
227a-28a, but did not actually rely upon it in resolving the narrow
tailoring issues. Id. at 246a-52a.
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unconstitutional if it appears to have any significant impact
upon which students are admitted. To the contrary, a raceconscious policy that did not meaningfully alter the
outcomes of the admissions process could not, for that very
reason, possibly be narrowly tailored. Such a policy would
incur most of the costs associated with governmental
consideration of race, while achieving nothing at all.
The most important "fit" question in this case,
therefore, is whether the scale of the Law School's plus
factor is appropriately tailored to the achievement of its
educational goals. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. On that
question, the record supplies a clear and undisputed answer.
A ruling that the Law School must place measurably less
weight on race will preclude it from enrolling a meaningful
number of minority students. However one measures the
scale of the Law School's plus factor, it is clearly the
minimum required to make the policy, in Justice Powell's
words, an "effective means" "to the attainment of
considerable ethnic diversity in the student body," 438 U.S.
at 315, in light of the current applicant pool.75
Justice Powell also recognized in Bakke that an
admissions program does not genuinely ''fit" the interest in
educational diversity unless it considers race only in the
context of a genuine commitment to diversity in a ''broad[]
array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or
ethnic origin is but a single though important element." 438
U.S. at 315. The program must therefore proceed on an
"individualized, case-by-case basis," id. at 319 n.53, cannot
isolate any applicants from competition with all others, and
must be ''flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements
of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each
applicant, and to place them on the same footing for
consideration, although not necessarily according them the
same weight." Id. at 317 (emphasis added).

75

The pool of high-scoring minority students was much smaller in 1978
than today; Harvard and similar institutions were necessarily giving a
substantial plus to minority students in order to achieve that goal.
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The Law School similarly engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each file, and gives serious
consideration to all of the ways that applicants might
contribute to a diverse educational environment. The Law
School does not, of course, accord all such potential
contributions the same weight, but it does weigh them
''fairly'' and "place them on the same footing for
consideration." Id. at 317-18. The Law School's "plus,"
however measured, is far smaller than the disparities at UCDavis in Bakke (0.61 to 0.94 points of GPA and 35 to 54
percentiles on the MCAT), id. at 277 n.7, and the subjective
diversity contributions of white and Asian American
students are frequently given similar weight. Supra p. 10.
It would also indicate a poor fit between the scale of the
Law School's plus factor and its educational goals if the
minority students being admitted in fact detracted from
rather than enhanced its educational environment-or did
not achieve the kinds of success, and provide the kinds of
leadership, that the Law School expects from its students
after graduation. The record in this case conclusively
dispels such notions. Supra p. 9.
The idea that minority students themselves are
somehow injured by being admitted to highly selective
institutions also wilts under scrutiny. Such students
graduate at significantly higher rates and earn much more
in later life than their peers with identical grades and test
scores who attend less selective schools. Shape of the River
54-68, 128, 264. Graduates of all races from selective
institutions support continued u~e of race in admissions to
achieve diversity by wide margins (much wider than the
population as a whole), indicating that the consequences of
such programs were enlightening-not stigmatizing.76 In
one recent study, 91% of the Law School's graduates
reported that racial diversity was a positive aspect of their

76

Shape of the River 118-255, 269; CAJA 2251 (almost 80% of white
graduates support retaining or expanding race-conscious admissions).
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experience.77 The Law School's consideration of race is, in
intent and effect, no more stigmatizing than the "plus" it
gives to some white students to ensure geographic
diversity, or to build a community across generations by
admitting children of alumni.
3. The Law School's program also does not "unduly
burden individuals who are not members of the favored
racial and ethnic groups." Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 630
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell recognized in
Wygant, the burden imposed by race-conscious "school
admission[s]" decisions, like the burden imposed by hiring
goals, ''is diffused to a considerable extent among society
generally." 476 U.S. at 282,283 n.11. Unlike a job layoff, in
which ''the entire burden of achieving racial equality" is
imposed on identifiable individuals, "resulting in serious
disruption of their lives," an admissions decision "often
foreclos[es] only one of several opportunities." Id. at 283.
The Law School of course understands that these
decisions are enormously important to all of its applicants,
and that failure to gain admission can be very disappointing.
But the Law School's consideration of race imposes a burden
on non-minority applicants so small and "diffuse" that it
barely affects their chances at all. By way of example, an
entirely race-blind process would have reallocated an
average of 41 seats in each incoming class between 1995 and
2000, CAJA 6047, among the approximately 2200 applicants
rejected each year. The Law School's policy thus offers
white and Asian American students a slightly smaller
chance of attending a school that is thereby able to offer
them (and others) a substantially better educational
experience if admitted-hardly an unreasonable burden.78
77

Orfield & Whitla, Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences
in Leading Law Schools, in Diversity Challenged: Evidence on the
Impact of Affirmative Action 160 (Orfield & Kurleander eds. 2001); see
also CAJA 2251, 5870-81, 6210, 6213-18; Brief for Michigan Black Law
Alumni Society as Amicus Curiae.
78
Barbara Grutter's application illustrates the point well. Although the
Law School's consideration of race may have decreased her chances of
admission slightly in the abstract, if the issue were tried the evidence
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Moreover, because the Law School's admissions policy is
typical of those used at law schools nationwide, the handful
of rejected students who would have been admitted under a
rigidly race-blind policy may be expected to have gained
admission to a comparable law school that is itself able to
offer the benefits of a racially integrated environment.
The burden imposed on non-minority applicants by the
Law School's policy is wholly different in nature from that
created by the FCC programs in Metro Broadcasting. The
FCC's distress sale program "created a specialized market
reserved exclusively for minority controlled applicants";
literally, a "100% set-aside." 497 U.S. at 630 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). And because "[t]he basic nonrace criteria
[were] not difficult to meet" in the comparative program,
race was "clearly the dispositive factor in a substantial
percentage
of
comparative
proceedings"-perhaps
"overwhelmingly the dispositive factor." Id. at 630-31.
By contrast, the record demonstrates beyond question
that academics, not race, is the dispositive factor in the vast
majority of the Law School's admissions decisions. CAJA
7476, 7585, 7637; Tr. 2:210-13. The Law School's academic
criteria are overwhelmingly difficult to meet-so difficult
that only a small fraction of our Nation's college· graduates
can meet its standards. From among that group, the Law
School considers each applicant as an individual and strives
to admit a student body that will best further its educational
goals. The Law School (while appropriately conscious of the
racial and ethnic background of most applicants) has not, in
other words, subordinated traditional criteria in a way that
would make race the "predominant factor" in the admissions
process. Hunt, 526 U.S. at 547.
4. Close scrutiny of the fit between means and ends and
of the burden on non-minority applicants imposes
would show that she would not have been admitted even under a rigidly
race-neutral policy. One hundred and thirty-five other white applicants in
the same or higher "cells" than Ms. Grutter were rejected along with her
in 1997; 35 white applicants from lower cells were admitted; and the wait
list she was on included more than 500 applicants. See JA 175; CAJ A 458.
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meaningful constraints on the consideration of race within
the framework established by Bakke. Petitioner's abstract
contention that the Law School's "plus" is simply too large
offers no workable alternative. A holding along those lines
would, as a practical matter, likely preclude any selective
institution from employing any plus program to enroll
meaningful numbers of minority students. The difficulty of
measuring the precise weight given to race versus other
diversity factors, coupled with the difficulty of articulating a
reasoned but clear definition of how much weight this factor
among others may be given, means that such a ruling would
create far too much exposure to disruptive and costly
litigation. As Justice Powell properly recognized in Bakke,
if the standards described above are met-and they are
here-there ''is no warrant for judicial interference in the
academic process." 438 U.S. at 319 n.53.
D. The Law School's Special Attention To AfricanAmeriean, Hispanic And Native American
Applicants Is Based On Reasoned Principle
Petitioner contends (Pet. Br. at 43) that the Law
School's policy is illogical and ''haphazard" in the choice of
racial or ethnic groups for which it shows a particular
concern. It is not. That policy's objective is to assemble a
class that is both academically superior and richly diverse in
a variety of ways that include, but certainly are not limited
to, race and ethnicity. The Law School therefore pays
attention to the racial or ethnic background of every
applicant, to the extent that it sheds any light on their
experiences and ''likely contributions to the intellectual and
social life of the institution." CAJA 314; id. at 7783, 7248.79
79

Petitioner argues that the Law School has drawn a special distinction
between Puerto Rican applicants born on the mainland and those born in
Puerto Rico, and between Mexican American and other Hispanic
applicants. The Law School's pre-1992 system did draw distinctions like
these, but its current policy was revised to provide a special commitment
to enrolling a "critical mass" of "Hispanics" generally. Supra p. 10 n.15;
CAJA 321, 7263 (Munzel, director of admissions), 477 (Dean Lehman).
Bulletins were printed for several years that failed to reflect the change,
but that mistake was corrected by 1997. Compare CAJA 1729 wi.th 1885.
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But the Law School's desire for meaningful numbers of
African-American, Hispanic and Native American students
is, in several important respects, unique. By virtue of our
Nation's unfortunate past and ongoing struggle with racial
inequality, such students are both uniquely likely to have
had experiences of particular importance to the Law
School's mission, and uniquely unlikely to be admitted in
meaningful numbers on criteria which ignore those
experiences. The Law School's goal of fostering interaction
and understanding across traditional racial lines also
particularly requires African-American, Hispanic and
Native American students, since those are the groups most
isolated by racial barriers in our country. For similar
reasons, the educational pitfalls associated with isolation are
particularly salient for these students. See supra p. 26.
If educational experience revealed a similar confluence
of issues with respect to other discrete ethnic groups, the
Law School would modify its policy to acknowledge that
fact. 80 Petitioner's complaint that the Law School ignores
the "dozens of separate racial or ethnic groups" from which
its white and Asian American students hail is wrong
(because, as noted, the Law School does consider such
information) and misses the point. Narrow tailoring does
not require the Law School to blindly give the same ''plus"
to every ethnic group it can identify, regardless of its
salience to the educational mission-and regardless of
whether members of that group would be well represented
in the student body anyway. Such a regime would be
impossibly unwieldy, self-negating, and would serve no
coherent interest whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth, this Court should affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.

80

See, e.g., Pet. App. 213a n.15 (recognizing that Asian and Jewish
Americans are also likely to have had unique experiences because of their
ethnicity, but that they are "already being admitted to the law school in
significant numbers" on race-neutral criteria); CAJA 7520-21 (same).
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